Indiana Law Journal
Volume 73

Issue 2

Article 9

Spring 1998

Professional Responsibility and Organization of the Family
Business: The Lawyer as Intermediary
Alysa Christmas Rollock
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and
the Legal Profession Commons

Recommended Citation
Rollock, Alysa Christmas (1998) "Professional Responsibility and Organization of the Family Business:
The Lawyer as Intermediary," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 73 : Iss. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol73/iss2/9

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Professional Responsibility and
Organization of the Family Business: The
t
Lawyer as Intermediary
ALYSA CHRISTMAS ROLLOCK"

I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers are often called upon to represent multiple clients in organizing
businesses. Such representation may include advice as to the appropriate form
of business entity, capitalization, internal governance, and, in the case of family
businesses, estate planning. In many of these situations, the parties have already
reached a preliminary agreement as to the general structure of their investment
in the enterprise, and they wish to minimize the legal costs associated with
starting the business. Although the representation of multiple clients by a lawyer
acting as an "intermediary" between or among clients with potentially conflicting
interests has gained widespread acceptance in the profession,' the benefits of
such representation to each client do not necessarily outweigh the costs to the
client occasioned by the lawyer's divided loyalty. This is particularly true in the
case of a family business. The existence of a familial relationship may contribute
to a failure by the lawyer and/or the clients to recognize or fully appreciate the
potentially conflicting interests of the family members. Moreover, current trends
with respect to the creation of new forms of business entities 2 and the recent

t © 1998 by Alysa Christmas Rollock.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; A.B.,
1981, Princeton University; J.D., 1984, Yale University. This Article is based upon an address
presented at Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington on April 4, 1997, as part of its
Law and the New American Family Symposium. I would like to thank Terry A. O'Neill and
Patrick L. Baude for their thoughtful responses in this issue. I would also like to thank Claire
Moore Dickerson and Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt for their comments on an earlier draft of this
Article, Aviva Orenstein for thoughtful discussions regarding this Article, and Lynne L. Dallas
and Marleen A. O'Connor for their support and encouragement.
1. See, e.g., MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1995). As of January

1, 1997, all or a significant portion of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct ("Model
Rules") had been adopted by 40 states. See STEPHEN GILLERS & RoY D. SIMON, JR.,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS 3 (1997); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 5-15 (1980) ("[T]here are many instances in which a lawyer may properly serve multiple
clients having potentially differing interests in matters not involving litigation.").
2. Since the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") issued its ruling in 1988 that a limited
liability company organized under the laws of the State of Wyoming, see Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§
17-15-101 to -144 (Michie 1997), would be classified as a partnership for federal income tax
purposes, see Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, every state and the District of Columbia have
enacted laws authorizing the creation of limited liability companies. For a compilation of such
statutes, see 2 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED

LIABILITY COMPANIES (1992 & Supp. 1997).

In 1991, Texas enacted the first registered limited liability partnership statute. See TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08 (West 1997). In 1995, applying the "Kintner regulations," see
infra note 8, the IRS ruled that a New York limited liability partnership would be classified as
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adoption by the IRS of its "check-the-box" regulations3 will require lawyers to
reexamine not only the advice that they render with respect to which type of
business entity is most appropriate for a given business enterprise, but also
whether the attorney may ethically represent all or some of the owners in
organizing that business.
Prior to adoption of the check-the-box regulations, the factors that were
generally considered to be most significant in determining the parties' choice of
entity were tax classification, owner liability for debts and obligations of the
enterprise, management, transferability of ownership interest, and continuity of
existence of the enterprise. 4 The IRS's method of determining the tax
classification of a business influenced not only the choice of entity, but also led
to the creation of various entities in response to that method.' Until it adopted the
check-the-box regulations,6 the IRS applied the Kintner regulations 7 to determine
whether an unincorporated organization would be taxed as "an association
taxable as a corporation" or as a "partnership" for federal income tax purposes!
Under the check-the-box regulations, certain entities (primarily corporations,

joint stock companies, insurance companies, banks, and publicly traded entities)
are always taxed as corporations.9 Domestic "eligible entities" with two or more
members are taxed as partnerships unless they affirmatively elect to be taxed as

corporations."' Single-owner unincorporated associations (including single-

a partnership for federal income tax purposes. See Rev. Rul. 95-55, 1995-35 I.R.B. 13. Today,
a majority ofjurisdictions have enacted legislation authorizing the creation of limited liability
partnerships. For a compilation of such statutes, see ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP AcT 85 tbl.2.1 (1997). A number of states, including Delaware, Texas, and

Colorado, have also enacted statutes authorizing limited liability limited partnerships wherein
the liability of the general partner is limited by statute.
3. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended by T.D. 8697, 1997-2 I.R.B. 11).
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CARY & MELvIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 117-20 (7th ed. 1995).
5. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BuSINESs ORGANIZATIONS 85 (1996).
6. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3.
7. See id. § 301.7701-2 (as effective prior to T.D. 8697, 1997-2 I.R.B. 11).
8. The Kintner regulations identified six corporate characteristics: (1) the presence of
associates, (2) an object to carry on business and divide the gains, (3) continuity of life, (4)
centralization of management, (5) limited liability, and (6) free transferability of interests. See
id An unincorporated business would be taxed as a corporation if it had more corporate than
noncorporate characteristics. Since the presence of associates and an object to carry on business
and to divide the gains are common to both partnerships and corporations, the classification
of an entity depended on the remaining characteristics. Thus, in order for an entity to be
characterized as a partnership, it must have had no more than two of the following
characteristics: (1) continuity of life, (2) centralization of management, (3) limited liability, and
(4) free transferability of interests. Until 1988, investors were generally unable to limit the
personal liability of investors who actively participated in management and obtain classification
as a partnership for federal income tax purposes, thereby avoiding the "double tax" on income
of an unincorporated association that is taxable as a corporation. See id.
9. See id. (as amended by T.D. 8697, 1997-2 I.R.B. 11).
10. See id. § 301.7701-3.
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owner limited liability companies) are taxed directly to the individual owner, and
the entity is ignored unless the entity elects to be taxed as a corporation."
The adoption of the check-the-box regulations reduces the importance of the
characteristics of conduit-type taxation, limited liability, continuity of existence,
and transferability of ownership interests in selecting a form of business entity.
Owners need no longer sacrifice "corporate" characteristics, most notably limited
liability and centralized management, in order to achieve conduit-type taxation
at the federal level. At the same time that these characteristics assume lesser
significance, the differences in the fiduciary duties owed by owners and/or
managers to owners of the enterprise in the various forms of business entities
assume greater significance. Although there is some debate about the precise
12
contours of the fiduciary duties owed to members of a limited liability company
and to shareholders of a corporation-especially a closely held corporationP 3-it

11. See id §§ 301.7701-1 to -3.
12. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized: FiduciaryDuties
Under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REv. 417 (1995)
[hereinafter Dickerson, EquilibriumDestabilizedJ; Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the
Looking Glass: Good Faith,FiduciaryDuty & PermittedHarm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 955
(1995); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging
Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 378, 401 (1992) (predicting that the rule for limited liability companies
will evolve toward general partner-type duties for members in member-managed limited
liability companies and toward corporate director-type duties for managers in managermanaged limited liability companies).
13. Closely held corporations are corporations with a relatively small number (generally
fewer than 50) of shareholders. See, e.g., CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 389; Lawrence
E. Mitchell, ProfessionalResponsibility andthe Close Corporation:Toward a Realistic Ethic,
74 CORNELL L. REv. 466, 476-77 (1989) (listing various factors used to define close
corporations). Mitchell includes in his factors, either singly or in combination:
(1) a small number of shareholders, (2) restrictions on share transferability, (3) a
disregard of corporate formalities, (4) the substantial personal interaction of
participants, (5) a lack of significant trading of securities, (6) an election to be
treated as a close corporation, (7) a substantial identity of ownership and
management, (8) proportionately substantial wealth invested by each shareholder
in the corporation, and (9) the illiquidity of ownership interests.
Id (citations omitted). Compare Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (111. 1964) (defining a
close corporation as "one in which the stock is held in a few hands, or in a few families, and
wherein it is not at all, or only rarely, dealt in buying or selling"), Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976) (using the Donahue standard where it was held
that stockholders in a close corporation owe each other basically the same fiduciary duty that
the partners owe each other), andDonahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16
(Mass. 1975) (stating that "[s]tockholders in close corporations must discharge their
management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith standard"
whereas there is a "somewhat less stringent standard of fiduciary duty to which directors and
stockholders of all corporations must adhere in the discharge of their corporate
responsibilities"), with Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993) (pointing out that
a new subchapter of Delaware law came into effect which holds that a close corporation is
defined only as one where (1) it is designated as such on its certificate of incorporation, (2) it
has 30 or fewer stockholders, (3) there is no "public offering," and (4) all classes of stock have
at least one restriction on their transfer), and Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d
352, 356-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that Minnesota's dispositive requirement of "close
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is generally accepted that, in the absence of an explicit agreement to the contrary,
partners (whether of a general partnership, a limited partnership, a limited
liability partnership, or a limited liability limited partnership) are likely to be
held to a higher standard of loyalty and care to one another than that which is
imposed on members of a limited liability company or shareholders of a
corporation. 4 As a result of these changes in the tax law, in selecting a form of
entity, organizers are, to a certain extent, also selecting the duties of care and
loyalty that they will owe and be entitled to receive from one another.
Furthermore, alteration of the statutory duties of loyalty and care through
agreement of the parties necessarily involves the sacrifice by one or more of the
clients of significant rights, rights that should not be modified without full and
frank legal advice regarding the consequences of such actions. Such advice may
be less than forthcoming where the lawyer acting as an intermediary has duties
to the other parties to the transaction.
This Article examines the appropriate course of conduct for attorneys.who are
asked to provide legal advice in connection with the organization of a nonfarm
family business. This Article first examines some of the features of familyowned businesses that make representation of multiple family members
problematic. While this Article focuses primarily on the representation of
spouses, its analysis and conclusions also apply to representation in the
organization of family businesses whose investors consist of other relatives. 5
The Article identifies areas of potential conflict between the interests of spouses
in the organization of a business. In addition, this Article considers the guidance
provided by the American Bar Association's Model Rules 6 and the
communitarian 7 and contract" models of representation in determining whether

corporation" status is that there be 35 or fewer shareholders).
14. See Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized,supra note 12, at 428-30; Terry A. O'Neill,
Self-Interest and Concernfor Others in the Owner-ManagedFirm:A SuggestedApproach to
Dissolutionand FiduciaryObligation in Close Corporations,22 SETON HALL L. REV. 646,
677-86 (1992). Compare UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21 (1914) (requiring a partner to be
accountable as a fiduciary), and Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) ("Joint
adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the
finest loyalty .... Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior."), with MODEL Bus. CORP. ACTANN. § 8.30 (1996) (outlining general
standards of conduct of directors), Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939) (holding that
corporate officers and directors owe undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation),
Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d 657 (deciding that shareholders in a closely held corporation owe loyalty
and good faith to other shareholders), Donahue, 328 N.E.2d 505 (holding that in closely held
corporations loyalty among shareholders is essential just as it is between partners), and Francis
v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (stating that corporate directors must exercise
reasonable supervision and care over the policies and practices of a corporation).
15. The approach will also apply to family businesses that include in-laws, as well as to
nontraditional families. For discussions Qf nontraditional families, see, for example, Martha
Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside ofthe NaturalFamily: The Limits ofPrivacy,23 CONN.
L. REV. 955 (1991); Kris Franklin, Note, "A Family Like Any Other Family:" Alternative
Methods ofDefiningFamily in Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027 (1990-1991).

16. See infra Part IV.A.
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See infra Part IV.C.
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the existence of such conflicts are so inconsistent with the lawyer's proper role
and the parties' reasonable expectations that joint representation should always
be avoided. Finally, this Article concludes that the failure by an attorney to
appreciate and consider the separate and potentially conflicting interests of
inactive or subordinated family members in the organization of a family business
is incompatible with the ethical practice of law. In determining whether an
attorney may ethically accept joint representation of multiple family members,
the family should be viewed by the attorney neither as a unit nor as an
aggregation of individuals possessing identical interests, but rather as
autonomous individuals with potentially conflicting interests. Intermediation
should be possible in some circumstances, but the attorney should undertake that
representation only after concluding that the joint representation will benefit
each of the parties and after obtaining their informed consent. If joint
representation is not undertaken, the lawyer should make his or her role clear to
the unrepresented party and advise such party to consider consulting with his or
her own counsel regarding the transaction.
II. REPRESENTING A FAMILY BUSINESS

A. Types of Family Businesses
Ownership of a business by a family may be either explicit or implicit. Explicit
ownership exists where both spouses (or family members) possess legal and/or
beneficial ownership interest in the business. Such interests may be owned
individually or jointly. In some circumstances, both spouses will exercise
management and control of the business and/or the family's investment therein.
In other cases, as when individual or joint ownership is selected for estate
planning purposes, one of the spouses may not be active in the management and
control of the business and/or the family's investment in the business.
Implicit family ownership, on the other hand, exists in the absence of legal or
beneficial ownership of (or a community property interest in) a business
enterprise by both spouses (or family members) where (1) marital (or family)
assets have been used to acquire the ownership interest of the spouse (or family
member) who does possess title, or (2) the non-title-holding spouse (or family
member) provides various financial commitments to the business. These financial
commitments may take the form of personal guarantees of the enterprise's debt
or mortgaging of property to secure financing by third parties. Ownership should
be considered implicit because the spouse who invests in the business without
receiving legal or beneficial ownership of an interest in the business does so in
large measure because of that party's expectation that the economic benefits
derived by the other spouse are family assets and because that party's economic
welfare depends, at least in part, on the other spouse's wealth. Although a spouse
whose ownership is implicit may be involved in the management or control of the
business or the family's investment therein, in most circumstances, an implicit
owner will not be actively involved in the management or control of the business
and will not direct the family's investment therein. Whatever the nature of the
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spouses' ownership interests, each spouse will be affected by the advice the
lawyer renders with respect to the organization of the business.
B. Failureto Recognize DivergingInterests
Attorneys and clients often fail to fully appreciate the diverging and potentially
conflicting interests of spouses. Such failure may be attributed to a number of
factors. The attorney and the client(s) may place too great an emphasis on the
unity of interest that society ascribes to married persons and relatives.
Individuals in a marriage (or family) relationship are often perceived as parts of
a larger whole. Indeed, it is common to refer to the act of marriage as a uniting
of two individuals. 9 By focusing on their status as a single entity, attorneys and
spouses have a tendency to emphasize the commonality of interest of the spouses
over the separate, and often diverging interests of each individual. Such a view
presupposes that whatever advances the economic or other interests of one
spouse must necessarily also advance those of the other spouse.20 Such views of
marriage and the participants therein overlook other conceptions of marriage
and/or family relationships in which spouses retain greater individual autonomy
or in which marriage is not regarded as a permanent status. 2'
In the case of implicit ownership, the parties often fail to perceive the
economic interest of the spouse whose ownership interest is implicit. Since the
ownership is not obvious, indeed the second spouse may not attend any meetings
with the lawyer, the parties may simply overlook the separate interests of the
second spouse. Furthermore, because of the parties' notions of the marriage
relationship and/or the existence of a subordinated spouse (typically the wife) or
family member, the financial commitments made by such spouse or family
member (such as mortgages and guarantees of the business's debts) are viewed
not as indicia of an economic interest, as they would be if made by unrelated
third parties, but rather as gratuities. Pursuant to this view, the implicit owner
executes the mortgage or guaranty as an act of altruism to benefit the spouse who
will be the explicit owner. Such a view fails to take into account the possibility
that the spouse, who will be an implicit owner, may act in a self-interested
manner and may have economic motives as well. The implicit owner may well
expect to share in the financial benefits that are expected to accrue as a result of
the use of family assets or the making of financial commitments.
Finally, whether ownership is explicit or implicit, the attorney and the spouses
may fail to consider that the marriage will not continue indefinitely. One of the
spouses may die prior to the termination of the business. In addition, current
divorce rates suggest that there is a significant chance that any marriage will end

19. See Genesis 2:24 (King James) ("Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother,
and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh.").
20. Such a view is typified by the expression, "What's mine is yours and what's yours is
mine."
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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in divorce.' Although the spouses may not contemplate such an unhappy end to
their relationship, the lawyer should be expected not only to consider such a
possibility, but also to render advice that either takes into account the
possibilities of death and/or divorce, or that, at the express direction of the
client(s), consciously discounts or ignores such possibilities.
III. POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING INTERESTS

Before examining some areas of potentially conflicting interests between
spouses in the organization of a family business,' it is helpful to identify some
of the areas in which an attorney is called upon to render advice in connection
with the organization of a business. These areas include, but are not limited to,
choice of entity, internal firm governance, finance, dispute resolution, and exit
strategy. The resolution of many of these issues may require negotiation among
the organizers. In reaching an agreement with respect to these matters, both the
organizers and the attorney expect that the attorney will evaluate and discuss the
implications of proposed resolutions and the factual assumptions underlying
them.24 For the lawyer to simply await client direction as to the resolution of
these issues would reduce the lawyer's role to that of a mere scrivener.25 On the
contrary, the role of counsel to the organizers of a business is more often that of
"an initiator, a planner, and an advisor."26 Potential conflicts between the

22. The number of individuals obtaining divorce decrees quadrupled during the period from
1950 to 1992. This rate translates into more than one million divorces annually. See Barbara
A. Babb, An InterdisciplinaryApproach to Family Law Jurisprudence:Application of an
Ecologicaland TherapeuticPerspective, 72 IND. L.L 775,778 & nn.22-23 (1997) (citing U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1994, at 75, 103
(l14th ed. 1994)).
23. For treatments of the dual representation of spouses in the estate planning area, see
Teresa Stanton Collett, And the Two Shall Become as One... Until the Lawyers Are Done, 7
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.POL'Y 101 (1993) [hereinafter Collett, And the Two Shall
Become as One]; Teresa Stanton Collett, Disclosure,Discretion, or Deception: The Estate
Planner'sEthicalDilemmafrom a UnilateralConfidence, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 684
(1994); Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to
Conflicts in RepresentingSpouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253 (1994); Report of the Special
Study Committee on ProfessionalResponsibility: Comments and Recommendations on the
Lawyer's Duties in Representing Husband and Wife, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.765
(1994); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism,65 TEx. L. REV. 963
(1987).
24. See Mitchell, supranote 13, at 482-84.
25. See id
26. Id, at 483. Professor Mitchell goes on to state:
[The lawyer] will be an initiator in that she will suggest economic, legal, and
practical considerations and possible courses of action which have not been
considered or fully appreciated by the parties. She will be a planner in that she
will lay out the organizational model and assist in the allocation of rights and
responsibilities between the parties. And she will be an advisor in that she will
counsel each of the parties with respect to the course of action which is likely to
be most profitable to each of them based upon their individual circumstances and
desires.
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interests of the spouses become apparent when the attorney explores issues
relating to each of these areas with the clients.
A. Choice ofEntity
As discussed previously, an entity's tax classification for federal and state
income tax purposes and the standard of loyalty and care imposed on owners and
managers of a business to the fellow owners of that enterprise are among the
most significant factors for the parties in determining the form of their business
entity.27 In the case of the majority of spouses who file joint tax returns and
would therefore have similar interests with respect to the tax treatment of their
investment in the business, differences in the nature of the fiduciary duties
imposed on owners and managers of the various forms of business entities have
particular significance. For example, if one of the spouses will not be active in
the management of the business, he or she may be better served by an entity that
imposes more stringent standards of loyalty and care upon owner-managers of
the business. On the other hand, a spouse who will be active in the management
of the business may be better served by the selection of a business entity that
limits his or her exposure to claims by fellow owners relating to breaches of
fiduciary duties28 or, if possible, by altering such duties by contract.
B. InternalFirm Governance
The allocation of rights and responsibilities among the owners and managers
of a business will depend upon, among other things, the relative ownership
interest of the parties, the extent to which each owner expects to participate in
the management of the business, and the extent to which each owner may be
subject to liability for the conduct of the business. For example, if only one of
the spouses is to participate in the management of the business, that spouse may,
by virtue of his or her broader exposure to liability (both with respect to thirdparty tort claims and to coowner fiduciary-duty claims), wish to obtain
correspondingly broader discretion to manage the business. A nonmanaging
spouse may be better served by a governance structure that provides for relatively
greater access to information regarding the business and rights to approve major
transactions or changes in the business. Likewise the interests of the spouses will
differ if one or both is to be employed by the business. If one or both
contemplates that all or a substantial portion of their investment return in the
business will take the form of compensation, such expectation might be better
protected through the execution of an employment agreement.

Id. (citation omitted).
27. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
28. Variations among the standards of loyalty and care may not be as significant if the
choice is between a partnership and a close corporation. In many jurisdictions, courts impose
partnership-like fiduciary duties on shareholders in close corporations. See sources cited supra
note 12. For example, Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized,supra note 12, at 442, highlights
several close corporation cases which recognize a heightened fiduciary duty for a partner who
manages the business and who is also the controlling shareholder.
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C. Finance
Organizers of a business must make many decisions regarding the financing of
their business. At the onset, the parties must determine the amount of their
investment and the form in which it will take. While creditors generally have first
claim to the assets of the business upon liquidation, creditors must, in the
absence of insolvency, rely upon contractually negotiated provisions with respect
to any rights in the business.2 9 Thus, investors must decide whether and to what
extent their investment in the business will be an equity one. To the extent that
the business will obtain financing from third parties, the owners may be required
to guaranty and/or pledge assets to secure such a debt." The desirability of
contribution and/or indemnification agreements by and among the business, its
equity owners, and its guarantors will vary depending upon, among other things,
the personal assets and degree of participation in the management of the business
of each spouse. The conflict between the interests of the spouses intensifies if
one of the spouses is to be an implicit owner. The implicit owner has no legal
claim on the assets of the business and no right to share in its proceeds. To the
extent that a court would distribute an ownership interest in, or include the
explicit owners' interest in calculating the parties' marital assets for division and
distribution upon divorce, the spouse who is the implicit owner is at a distinct
disadvantage in accurately valuing the business. In addition, decisions made
during the marriage with respect to compensation of the spouse who is active in
managing the business may be less desirable from the perspective of the
nonactive spouse should the parties divorce. Thus, a spouse who will be an
implicit owner or who does not anticipate actively participating in the
management of the business has a much greater interest in anticipating divorce
than does the spouse who is an explicit owner or who will be active in the
management of the business.
D. Dispute Resolution
Attorneys representing the organizers of a business will often suggest that the
parties consider a number of mechanisms to resolve disputes that may arise in the
future. Among the mechanisms that the parties may adopt are agreements to
submit disputes to arbitration, the granting of rights to approve or veto specified
firm transactions or changes, various purchase and sale arrangements, and rights
to or restrictions on the ability of a party to cause the liquidation of the business.
As is the case with issues surrounding the financing of the business, the parties'

29. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Pittleman v. Pearce, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359 (Ct. App. 1992); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d
300 (Del. 1988); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986); see also, e.g., Bruce
A. Markell, The Folly of RepresentingInsolvent Corporations:Examining Lawyer Liability
and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, 6 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAc. 403 (1997) (explaining that the corporation and directors may owe a fiduciary duty to
the creditors upon insolvency).
30. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.3, at25 (1986).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 73:567

interests with respect to a particular method of dispute resolution may differ
depending upon the level of their participation in the management of the business
and the nature of his or her ownership interest.
E. Exit Strategy

Prudent organizers of a business and their counsel will also consider the
manner in which the owners may terminate their investment and/or participation
in the business. The parties may have differing preferences as to whether they
wish to continue their investment and participation in the business with a new
owner or manager. As a result, the parties may wish to consider either selecting
a form of business entity that restricts the transfer of ownership interests by
statute or adopting contractual restrictions on such transfers. Depending on
factors such as age or health, estate tax issues may also be a factor in the parties'
interests not only with respect to adopting mechanisms to value the business and
each owner's respective interest therein upon death, but also with respect to the
desirability of mandatory or optional purchase and sale provisions designed to
provide liquidity to the estate of the deceased owner. The parties may also have
differing interests with respect to the possible adoption of purchase and sale
provisions to be triggered upon divorce. To the extent that one party is not active
in the management of the business, this party will be at a disadvantage in valuing
the business in the event that its value will be included in the calculation of
marital assets, in detecting misappropriation of funds, and in objecting to levels
of compensation that, while not objectionable when applied to the family's total
income, is excessive when the spouses are no longer sharing that compensation.
IV. INTERMEDIATION

The Model Rules and the communitarian and contract models of representation
offer guidance to attorneys in determining whether they may ethically represent
both spouses in the formation of a business. However, each of these sources fails
to take sufficient account of the reasonable expectations of each spouse
(especially in the case of implicit ownership) while providing clear standards for
attorneys.
A. The Model Rules
The Model Rules contemplate that a lawyer may represent multiple clients in
a single matter under certain circumstances.3' Such representation is governed by
Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2. Model Rule 1.7 sets forth the circumstances when a
lawyer is generally prohibited from undertaking simultaneous representation of
two clients, while Model Rule 2.2 identifies the circumstances under which a
lawyer may act as an intermediary between clients. Model Rule 1.7 provides:

3 1. For a comprehensive treatment of the representation of multiple clients under the Model
Rules, see John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries:The Representationof Multiple
Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 741.
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(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will
be directly averse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect
the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved. 2
Since the representation of investors in the organization of a business generally
does not involve matters that are directly adverse at the outset of the
representation (although such adversity may develop later and require withdrawal
or informed consent), Model Rule 1.7(b) provides the initial standard for
determining whether such representation is permitted. Thus the lawyer must first
determine that the representation of each client will not be adversely affected by
the joint representation. If the lawyer determines that such representation will not
be adversely affected, the lawyer must explain to each client the implications of
the common representation and the risks and benefits to each of the common
representation. This explanation must also include a discussion of the effect on
the attorney-client privilege and the lawyer's role should a dispute arise between
or among the clients. Finally, the lawyer must obtain each client's informed
consent.
If the lawyer is not prohibited from representing the parties under Model Rule
1.7 and has obtained the parties' consent to the common representation, the
lawyer must also comply with the provisions of Model Rule 2.2. Recognizing a
"subtle distinction between representing clients with distinct interests ... and
representing clients who, though adverse in their respective positions, share a
more compelling interest in reaching agreement as a group,' 3 the drafters of the
Model Rules chose to treat the role of the lawyer as intermediary in a separate
rule rather than as a subsection of Model Rule 1.7(b). 4
The concept of a lawyer as intermediary has its origins in Justice Louis
Brandeis's concept of service as a "counsel for the situation."3 In hearings

32.

MODEL RULES OF PROFEsSIONAL CONDuCT

Rule 1.7 (1995).

33. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAMHODE, THELAw OF LAWYERING § 2.2:101,
at 512 (Supp. 1993).
34. See id
35. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS INTHE PRACTICE OF LAW 58-68 (1978); A.L.
TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 118 (1964); Dzienkowski, supra
note 3 1, at 748-57; John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics ofLouis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV.
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before the Senate Judiciary Committee relating to his nomination to the Supreme
Court, several of Brandeis's opponents, including the then current president and
seven former presidents of the American Bar Association, accused Brandeis of
numerous violations of the legal profession's norms of ethical conduct? 6 Several
of these charges related to his representation of multiple clients with conflicting
interests. 37 In response, Brandeis was reported to have asserted that in those
circumstances he was acting as "counsel for the situation," and attempting to
balance the rights and obligations of each party in order to arrive at a solution
which would be equitable to each party. 38 Although there was disagreement over
whether an attorney could ethically act as "counsel for the situation," the Senate
eventually rejected these charges and confirmed his nomination.39 In 1983, in
large part due to the efforts of Geoffrey Hazard, Reporter to the Kutak
Commission, which was responsible for drafting the Model Rules, the American
Bar Association incorporated Brandeis's concept of "lawyer for the situation"
into Model Rule 2.2.40

683, 702 (1965).
36. See Dzienkowski, supra note 31, at 742.
37. Professor Hazard describes the following charges as raising the "lawyer for the
situation" concept:
First, Brandeis had at one time represented one party in a transaction, [and then]
later represented someone else in a way that impinged on that transaction. Second,
he acted in situations where those he served had conflicting interests, for example
by putting together the bargain between parties to a business deal. Third, he acted
for a family business and continued so to act after a falling out among the family
required reorganization of the business arrangement. Fourth, over the course of
several years he had mediated and adjusted interests of the owners and creditors
of a business in such a way as to keep the business from foundering.
HAZARD, supranote 35, at 60.
38. See Dzienkowski, supra note 31, at 743.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 744. In writing on the benefits of and risks associated with lawyers serving
as counsel for the situation, Professor Hazard noted that such a lawyer
is no one's partisan and, at least up to a point, everyone's confidant. He can be the
only person who knows the whole situation. He is an analyst of the relationship
between the clients, in that he undertakes to discern the needs, fears, and
expectations of each and to discover the concordances among them. He is an
interpreter, translating inarticulate or exaggerated claims and forewamings into
temperate and mutually intelligible terms of communication. He can contribute
historical perspective, objectivity, and foresight into the parties' assessment of the
situation. He can discourage escalation of conflict and recruitment of outside
allies. He can articulate general principles and common custom as standards by
which the parties can examine their respective claims. He is advocate, mediator,
entrepreneur, and judge, all in one. He could be said to be playing God.
Playing God is a tricky business. It requires skill, nerve, detachment,
compassion, ingenuity, and the capacity to sustain confidence. When mishandled
it generates the bitterness and recrimination that results when a deep trust has
been betrayed. Perhaps above all, it requires good judgement as to when such
intercession can be carried off without unfairly subordinating the interests of one
of the parties or having later to abort the mission.
When a relationship between clients is amenable to "situation" treatment,
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Model Rule 2.2 provides:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the
common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the
effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent to
the common representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms
compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to
make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk
of material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated
resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be
undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities
the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client
concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in
making them, so that each client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests,
or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon
withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the
matter that was the subject of the intermediation."
As the comment to Model Rule 2.2 indicates, the rule contemplates that the
formation of a business will be a circumstance when a lawyer may properly act
as an intermediary for multiple clients. The comment states that a "lawyer acts
as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on
an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to
organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs." 42 Such
contemplation may contribute to lawyers minimizing the significance of potential
conflicts of interest between the clients.
Model Rule 2.2's preconditions to a determination by an attorney that he or she
may represent some or all of the organizers of a business as an intermediary
mirrors those under Model Rule 1.7. They do, however, provide slightly greater
guidance regarding the content of the consultation required with each client prior

giving it that treatment is perhaps the best service a lawyer can render to anyone.
It approximates the ideal forms of intercession suggested by the models of wise
parent or village elder. It provides adjustment of difference upon a holistic view
of the situation rather than bilaterally opposing ones. It rests on implicit principles
of decision that express commonly shared ideals in behavior rather than strict
legal right. The basis of decision is mutual assent and not external compulsion.
The orientation in time tends to be a hopeful view of the future rather than an
angry view of the past. It avoids the loss of personal autonomy that results when
each side commits his cause to his own advocate. It is the opposite of "going to
law."
HAZARD, supranote 35, at 64-65.
41. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 2.2 (1995).
42. Id. Rule 2.2 cmt. 3.
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to obtaining consent to the common representation, and regarding the factors to
be considered by the lawyer in arriving at a reasonable belief that such
representation will not harm any of the clients.
On their face, the Model Rules permit an attorney to represent both spouses (or
multiple family members) in the organization of a family business if the lawyer
reasonably believes such representation will not harm any of the clients, and if
the lawyer consults with and obtains informed consent from each of the clients
to the common representation. However, application of the Model Rules to the
circumstances surrounding the organization of a typical business suggests that
dual representation and intermediation should be less common if the attorney
takes seriously the potentially conflicting interests of spouses. Furthermore, as
John Dzienkowski has noted, Model Rule 2.2 still leaves a number of questions
unresolved that are of particular significance in the context of a lawyer serving
as intermediary in the organization of a business." Dzienkowski believes the rule
is deficient in areas such as the identification of the client (whether the
individual, the group, or the situation), the specific tasks to be performed by the
lawyer during the intermediation, the degree of the lawyer's involvement, and
whether the lawyer must judge the fairness of any proposed solution." These
areas are also important to lawyers serving as intermediaries in the formation of
businesses.
In addition to the problems identified by Dzienkowski, Model Rule 1.7 and
Model Rule 2.2 do not adequately address the situation of the spouse or family
member whose ownership interest is implicit or who does not expressly retain the
lawyer to represent him or her. Because the Model Rules adopt a consensual view
of the attorney-client relationship,45 the consideration given to potential conflicts
and the costs and benefits of the representation extends only to those who have
requested that the lawyer represent them. The very fact that a person's ownership
is implicit rather than explicit may evidence such person's lack of knowledge and
sophistication with respect to legal matters.
B. Communitarian Model of Representation
In contrast to the Model Rules's approach to representation of multiple clients
that takes as its starting point an analysis of the separate interests of each party
and then asks whether the representation of one will harm the interests of
another, the communitarian modelof representation takes as its starting point an
examination of the relationship of the parties to be represented. It sees
individuals as members of groups or communities and recognizes the effects of
such membership on human motivations. Scholars and practitioners in the area
of estate planning have debated the application of this model as it applies to
families.46 In particular they have attempted to resolve the question of whether,

43. See Dzienkowski, supranote 31, at 745.
44. See id. at 745-46.
45. See Scope of MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT para. 3 ("Most of the duties
flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer
to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so.").
46. See I HAZARD & HODEs, supranote 33, § 2.2:102, at 514.1 (Supp. 1997).
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and under what circumstances, a lawyer may ethically represent both spouses in
the preparation and execution of wills.47 Like the drafters of the Model Rules,
they generally conclude that such representation is possible, although they differ
as to the precise nature of the representation and as to whether the lawyer may
or must disclose the confidences of one spouse to the other.4"
Few scholars articulate the communitarian model of representation more
forcefully than Professor Thomas Shaffer.49 Professor Shaffer criticizes society's
and the legal profession's emphasis on the individual as a collection of interests
and rights, which he terms "radical individualism,"50 and the failure to accord
moral and ethical significance to "organic communities."'" In analyzing a
hypothetical case of a lawyer who drafts mutual wills for a married couple
following a joint interview, and who-in a conversation with the wife
immediately following execution of her husband's will and prior to execution of
her will-elicits from the wife her desire to change her will if she may do so
without the knowledge of her husband,52 Shaffer urges that the family, rather
than the individual spouses, should be treated as the client. According to Shaffer,
the description offered by "the legal ethics of radical individualism" incorrectly
views the relationship between the husband and wife as "a product of
individuality(!), of contract and consent, of promises and the keeping of
promises-all the consensual connections that lonely individuals use when they
want circumstantial harmony." 3 Such a view is, according to Shaffer, "sad,
corrupting, and untruthful."' The "truthful" description of the relationship in the
hypothetical is that the "lawyer's employer is the family." '5 The family, Shaffer
asserts, is an "organic community" that is "prior in life and in culture to
individuals." 6 A lawyer for the family should facilitate a dialogue between the
spouses regarding the wife's desires rather than withdraw from representation
altogether. According to Shaffer,
the most irresponsible thing a lawyer could do is to send either of these
people to another lawyer, or both of them to two other lawyers. If that is the
command of our professional's ethics, or even the easiest available "solution"
to the case from our regulatory rules, then our ethics and our rules are

47. See sources cited supranote 23.
48. For an excellent summary of the various positions, see Collett, And the Two Shall
Become as One, supranote 23 (discussing four models suggested in the literature: "(1) lawyer
for the family; (2) separate representation by separate lawyers; (3) separate simultaneous
representation by the same lawyer, and (4) joint representation by the same lawyer") (citations
omitted).
49. See Shaffer, supranote 23.
50. Id. at 970.
51. Id. at 965. Shaffer believes that families are organic communities that are "created,
sustained, and redeemed by God." Id. at 965 n.8, 972 n.35.
52. See id. at 968. The hypothetical is based upon facts presented by Stanley A. Kaplan,
The Case of the Unwanted Will, 65 A.B.A. J. 484, 486 (1979) (comments from John C.
Williams).
53. Shaffer, supra note 23, at 970.
54. Id.
55.Id.
56. Id. at 965-67.
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corrupting. They corrupt the family in general, and this family in particular.
A lawyer following the rules is irresponsible because in fact, the family is the
lawyer's client. The lawyer who sends the family away is not able to respond
to his client. He is disabled
by a false ethic and, in trying to protect himself,
57
he harms his client.
Shaffer's concept of a "lawyer for the family" correctly asks the legal
profession to consider the communal nature of human existence. An individual
is not merely a "nexus" of contracts and commitments to and with other persons.
People exist in relationships. They are part of groups that share common values
and interests. Shaffer's analysis supports the proposition underlying the
profession's general acceptance of the concept of a lawyer as an intermediary,
that individuals may share common goals and interests that make joint
representation desirable. However, Shaffer's description of the family may not
accurately fit the family in the hypothetical or families in general. 58 In addition,
Shaffer's conception ignores possible changes in relationships. Because he
considers marriage and family to be transcendent states that exist before, during,
and after the relationship, Shaffer does not address divorce or remarriage and the
changes they may bring. Although he acknowledges the paternalism inherent in
the model of the lawyer for the family, he discounts its danger by suggesting that
paternalism in a theological sense is- not a bad concept and that "[r]adical
individualism is the philosophy of an adolescent who wishes he had no
parents."59 Shaffer's lawyer for the family may thus have a tendency to substitute
the lawyer's judgment of what isbest for the family for the family members'
judgment. In the hypothetical, Shaffer suggests the lawyer should get the wife to
express her feelings to her husband. However, from the facts given, it is possible
that the wife may not wish to discuss the matter. She informed the lawyer that
she desired to change her will only if she could do so without the knowledge of
her husband. Moreover, although Shaffer states that a lawyer for the family will
actively seek out the views of all of the family members, there may be a tendency
to give greater voice to, and to listen more attentively to, the dominant spouse or
family member. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Shaffer's model provides
no guidance to the lawyer in determining whether multiple representation should
be undertaken in a specific case or how the lawyer is to act in the event of
disagreement among spouses or family members. Unlike an association with
bylaws or regulations for governance, or a business entity with clearly
identifiable decisionmakers and mechanisms for resolving disputes, spouses
generally have equal legal authority to make decisions regarding the family but
with limitations on the power to bind each other.

57. ld.at 982 (emphasis in original).
58. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 3-4 (1981)
(characterizing the "new family" by "increasing fluidity, detachability and interchangeability
of family relationships"); Collett, And the Two Shall Become as One, supra note 23, at 123

(arguing that the prevailing view is that marriage is a "consensual arrangement... that can be
dissolved when the consent no longer exists"); Fineman, supra note 15; Gregg Temple,
Freedom of ContractandIntimate Relationships,8 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 121, 150 (1985);

Franklin, supranote 15.
59. Shaffer, supra note 23, at 987.
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Russell Pearce offers an approach that seeks to address some of the criticisms
of Shaffer's approach.6 ° Pearce proposes that family members be allowed to
choose which type of representation, individual or group, they prefer. Like
Shaffer, Pearce believes that legal ethics rules tend to restrict lawyers to viewing
families as collections of individuals rather than as groups. Pearce urges that
legal ethics codes be changed to permit "optional family representation" in which
the lawyer offers his or her services to families as communities rather than as
individuals. Pearce believes his proposal overcomes many of the criticisms of
Shaffer's approach by allowing families, not lawyers, to decide on the form of
representation and by "requiring the existence of a bona fide family group and
continual disclosure of relevant information to afford family members the
opportunity to withdraw if they so choose.""'
Like Shaffer's model, Pearce's model fails to adequately identify the
decisionmaking mechanism within the family.62 Establishing such a mechanism
may not only divert energies from resolving the matter for which the family
originally sought legal advice, but may impose greater burdens on the family than
the benefits to be realized by family representation.
C. ContractModel ofRepresentation
The contract model of representation embodies the law's standard conception
of the attorney-client relationship as being fundamentally contractual in nature.63
Under this theory, the law looks to the actual intentions of the parties, whether
express or implied." Typically the client must request representation and the
lawyer must consent to provide such service. Under contract law's objective
theory of assent, in determining whether the lawyer has agreed to the
representation, the courts look to whether the lawyer's actions, judged by a
standard of reasonableness, evidence an agreement to be bound.6" The subjective
state of the attorney's intentions is irrelevant. The American Law Institute's
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers reflects this position. 66 An

60. See Pearce, supranote 23.
61. Id. at 1318.
62. See I HAZAD & HODES, supra note 33, § 2.2:102, at 514.2 (Supp. 1997).
63. See id. § 1.13:106, at75.
64. See Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to "Non-Clients":
Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other

Inherently.4mbiguousSituations,45 S.C. L. REV.659, 664 (1994).
65. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACrS § 3.6, at 119 (2d ed. 1990);
see also Moore, supranote 64, at 680.
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 1996) provides that an attorney-client relationship arises when:
(1)
a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide legal
services for the person; and either
(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide
the services; or
(2) a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to provide the services.
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attorney-client relationship will be established if a person demonstrates an intent
to have the lawyer provide services, and the lawyer either manifests an intent to
provide the service or fails to manifest an intent not to provide the service where
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person is relying on the
lawyer to provide such service.
While the contract model affords some protection to spouses (or family
members) who reasonably believe the lawyer is representing them, such persons
must nevertheless manifest an intention that the lawyer represent them.
Manifesting such intention may be problematic for spouses (or family members)
who are implicit owners. They may have no contact with the lawyer, but may
nonetheless reasonably believe that the lawyer is protecting their interests. For
example, the attorney may review guaranty and mortgage agreements for a
spouse or family member, who is an explicit owner, that will also be executed by
the implicit owner or that are identical to documents that will be executed by
such party. The implicit owner may reasonably rely on the advice given to the
explicit owner with respect to these documents. Although the reliance by the
implicit owner may be foreseeable by the attorney, no attorney-client relationship
would be formed under the contract model unless the implicit owner manifests
an intent to have the lawyer render legal services.
Responding to the limitations of the contract model, courts have recently
expanded attorney duties to nonclients. In so doing, courts have applied doctrines
relating to third-party beneficiaries, negligent representation, gratuitous
undertaking, and the "balance of factors" test in negligence.67 Although
providing some protection to third parties, attorney duties to third parties are
generally limited to competence.68
V. REASONABLE-EXPECTATIONS APPROACH
The legal profession's attempt to clarify the circumstances in which a lawyer
may ethically represent both spouses (or multiple family members) in the
organization of a family business is a useful first step in protecting the interests
of clients. However, the legal profession should adopt standards of conduct to
better protect unrepresented parties who reasonably, but mistakenly, believe the
lawyer is acting in their best interests.69 Since lay persons are unfamiliar with the
law in general, and attorney standards of ethics in particular, the burden should
be on lawyers to clarify their roles. Although the Model Rules prohibit lawyers
from stating or implying to unrepresented persons that they are disinterested
when they are acting on behalf of a client, and require attorneys to take

67. See Moore, supranote 64, at 659-60.
68. See id. at 698.
69. For other calls for a reasonable-expectations approach to client identification, see
Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts ofInterestin the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients:
A ProposedSolutionto the CurrentConfusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REv. 211 (1982);
Note, An ExpectationsApproach to Client Identity, 106 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1993) (discussing
client identification in limited partnerships and close corporations).
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reasonable steps to correct a party's misunderstanding of the lawyer's role,7" they
do not go far enough. Lawyers should assume in all instances that lay persons do
not understand the lawyer's role.' Futhermore, attorneys should be required to
take affirmative steps to advise unrepresented persons of their role.
I propose that, in the event an attorney determines that he or she may not
ethically represent both spouses (or all family members) or clarifies that he or
she will not be retained to represent both spouses, the lawyer must, at the earliest
opportunity, advise the unrepresented spouse (or family members) in writing that
the lawyer is not acting on such party's behalf. Such written notice might be
modeled upon the standard of disclosure proposed by the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers in the litigation context72 and might provide as follows:
1. I am your spouse's (family member's) lawyer.
2. I do not and will not represent you.
3. I will at all times look out for your spouse's (family member's) interests,
not your interests.
4. Any statements that I make to you about the proposed transaction,
including but not limited to, any advice that I might give to your spouse
(family member) about the execution of any agreements or instruments to
which you might also be a signatory, should be understood by you to be

70. Model Rule 4.3 provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel,
a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When a lawyer
knows or should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's
role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (1995).
71. Louisiana's version of Model Rule 4.3 provides:
A lawyer shall assume that an unrepresented person does not understand the
lawyer's role in a matter and the lawyer shall carefully explain to the
unrepresented person the lawyer's role in the matter.
During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer should not
give advice to a non-represented person other than the advice to obtain counsel.
LA. R.P.C. 4.3.
72. BOUNDs OF ADvOCACY: AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS STANDARDS

OF CONDuCr Standard 2.21 cmt. (1991) (footnotes omitted), provides:
Once it becomes apparent that an opposing party intends to proceed without a
lawyer, the attorney should, at the earliest opportunity, inform the opposing party
in writing as follows:
1. I am your spouse's lawyer.
2. I do not and will not represent you.
3. I will at all times look out for your spouse's interests, not yours.
4. Any statements I make to you about this case should be taken by you as
negotiation or argument on behalf of your spouse and not as advice to you as to
your best interest.
5. I urge you to obtain your own lawyer.
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made or given on behalf of your spouse (or family member) and not as
advice to you as to your best interest.
5. I urge you to obtain your own lawyer.
Failure to provide such disclosure should subject the lawyer to appropriate
sanctions by disciplinary authorities relating to violations of standards of
professional responsibility. In the event that a party reasonably expects that a
lawyer who failed to clarify his or her role represents such party, the party should
be deemed a client for the purposes of determining malpractice, including
malpractice based upon an impermissible conflict of interest with the represented
spouse (or family member). As Professor Nancy Moore observes, basing liability
upon the attorney-client relationship and not thirdparty liability serves to limit
attorney liability to third parties in general and to ensure that the duties owed by
the attorney to the party include those of loyalty and confidentiality as Well as
competence.73
Although the mandatory written disclosure that I propose will not guarantee
that all parties will be represented by counsel, it should alert both the client and
the unrepresented party to the fact that the unrepresented party has rights that
may need protection. In addition, having been alerted to the potentially
conflicting interests of his or her spouse (or family member), the client may well
seek advice from the attorney regarding ways in which such interests may be
protected or advanced by the client.
VI. CONCLUSION

In determining whether to act as an intermediary in the formation of a family
business, an attorney should treat spouses and family members as autonomous
individuals with potentially conflicting interests as well as common goals.
Although the proliferation of new forms of business entities and recent changes
in the federal income tax laws heighten the conflicts among investors and
between managers and investors in a business, intermediation by an attorney
should be ethically possible in many circumstances after obtaining the clients'
informed consent.
The attorney must, however, be mindful of the parties' expectations regarding
the attorney's role in the transaction. In the event that the attorney performs
services under circumstances in which an unrepresented spouse or family
member might reasonably expect that the lawyer is acting to protect that party's
legal interests, the lawyer should inform the unrepresented party in writing that
the lawyer is not in fact representing that party and advise that party to seek other
counsel. In the event that the attorney does not clarify his or her role and the
unrepresented party reasonably expects the attorney to be representing him or
her, the attorney should be deemed to have in fact represented such party and be
liable to such party for damages for any resultant malpractice as well as be

73. See Moore, supranote 64, at 698; cf Markell, supra note 29, at 417-18 (noting that
"beneficiaries are owed some consideration by lawyers for their fiduciaries").
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subject to appropriate sanctions relating to representation of multiple clients in
contravention of Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2. Although a seemingly harsh result,
such an ethical standard imposes the duty to prevent the harm on the party most
knowledgeable about and best able to prevent the harm.
Acknowledging and considering the separate and potentially conflicting
interests of spouses and family members will also assist the attorney in providing
competent counsel to his or her client(s). Discussion of these interests should
result in better planning with respect to the structure of the business and each
client's investment therein. Although tax considerations are often principal
factors in the choice of business entity and the decisions relating to capital
contributions and distributions, an awareness of the separate interests of each of
the investors may alter the attorney's advice and the decisions of the client(s)
with respect to these tax issues and with respect to internal firm governance,
dispute resolution, and exit strategies.
Finally, taking seriously the separate and potentially conflicting interests of
spouses and family members gives voice to the needs and desires of each with
respect to their shared assets. Paradoxically, the recognition of the autonomy of
spouses and family members may serve to strengthen the family's cohesiveness
because such recognition acknowledges the contributions and claims of each to
the family and its shared resources.

